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interest of the heirs, the receiver could be required to turn over to them
the profits from the publication. 9
TEMPORARY UTILITY RATES
THE LOGIC of the fair-return-on-a-fair-value concept requires that the rates
for public utility services be reduced during depressions.' When the earn-
ings of all industry fall, the fair return to which utilities are constitutionally
entitled should be deflated; and when the general price leyel declines and
all economic values collapse, utility properties should be assessed.at lower
figures. The failure of utility rates to move downward during a period of
depression contributes an element of rigidity to the price structure which
impairs its capacity to meet the strains of a depression. Domestic consumers
must either curtail their use of gas, electric, and telephone services or pay
a disproportionately large share of their reduced incomes for them and
industrial consumers who must pay for utility services at a high rate have
69. If the receiver is allowed to publish, yet is required to turn over the profits
from the publication to the writer's heirs, probably less profit will be realized from
publication than if the power to sell and the profits arising from the sale remained in
the same hands. For the receiver, having no interest in the profits, might publish imme-
diately upon the writer's death, despite the fact that the letters might bring more if
publication were deferred for a period of years. Yet if all the profits are given to
the representatives of the writer, surely they are amply protected financially.
1. See Prendergast, The Economic Emnergency as a Factor in Rate Making (1932)
10 P. U. FoRT. 243, 247; Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depre.r-
sion (1933) 46 HaRv. L. REv. 745, 751; Rooks and Booth, Current Problens of Public
Utility Rate Regulation (1934) 13 OE. L. R-v. 122; Jotms Aim BiGmHu, PnmicmLzs
op Punrac UTiLTIas (1931) 94.
2. That the necessity of utility services forces this latter course seems evident
from the infle.ible demand for them despite the depression.
Totals for all Utilities - 1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928
Electricity
Millions of customers 24.8 24.3 24.5 24.5 24.6 24.1 23.2
Billions of k.w.h. sold 70.8 65.8 63.8 71.9 74.9 75.2 67.
Average domestic consumption
in ki%%h. 631 604 601 584 543 500 463
Mllanufactured Gas
Millions of customers 9.9 9.76 10. 10.4 10.4 10.2
Millions of m.cu.ft. 359 340 356 389 401 399
Natural Gas
Millions of customers 7.2 7.0 7.0 5.4 5.0 4.3
Telephones
Millions of stations 15.4 16.1 18.1 18.4 1S.2 16.8
Average monthly messages in billions 2.23 2.39 2.59 2.63 2.63 2.44
Source: Moov-'s PuBLIC UTxLrris (1935) pp. alS, a21, a41, a47. a52.
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difficulty in adjusting their costs of production to lower levels.3 Further-
more, the rigidity of utility rates results in an uneven incidence of the de-
pression and in more severe deflation of other prices as incomes continue
to fall.4
Nothwithstanding the implications of the fair-return-on-a-fair-value con-
cept, the equities in favor of consumers, and the economic arguments for
flexibility in prices, utility rates have resisted the downward trend of prices
during the current depression with remarkable success.3 Speedy adjustment
of rates has been rendered impossible by the traditional technique of rate-
making judicially imposed upon utility' commissions. The valuation upon
which rates may constitutionally be based relies heavily upon reproduction
cost less depreciation;6 and investigation and analysis of the composite ele-
ments of reproduction cost is a cumbersome process requiring far too much
time to be effective during depression.7 Against any attempt to reduce utility
3. 'Contrast the sharp decrease of the total of national income with the level of
utility charges shown in note 5, infra.
National Income 1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928 1927
Billions of dollars 47.6 41.8 39.365 54.643 70.345 80.031 80.3 77.2
Figures from National Bureau of Economic Research and National Industrial Con-
ference Board, Moooys PUBLIc UTILITIES (1935) p. aS. See Phleger, Quo Vadis?
(1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 660.
4. Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 749 and authorities there cited; In re Wisconsin
Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1932D, 173; Newton D. Baker, counsel in Matter of East
Ohio Gas Co., No. 7130, filed Aug. 18, 1932, before the Public Utility Commission
of Ohio.
5. 1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928 1927
Electricity
cents/k.w.h.
Domestic 5.30 5.49 5.58 5.78 6.03 6.34 6.63 6.82
Retail 3.89 4.01 4.09 4.17 4.13 4.24 4.44 4.48
Wholesale 1.34 1.38 1.53 1.48 1.42 1.38 1.41 1.47
Total (weighted) 2.60 2.70 2.88 2.75 2.66 2.57 2.66 2.71
Manufactured Gas
dollars/m.cu.ft.
Domestic 1.06 1.11 1.15 1.11 1.11 1.11
Natural Gas
cents/m.cu.ft
Total 23.7 24.7 23.3 21.4 21.5 23.2 22.0
Index of Street Railwav Fares
(1913 = 100) 161.5 162.5 162. 161. 160. 157. 155.5 153.5
The figures are national averages for all companies. Source of statistics: MOODY'S
PUBLIC UTIrs (1935) pp. a17, a43, a48, a39, tables taken from U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, U. S. Dept. Labor. See Lilienthal,
supra note 1, at 748, 749, 751.
6. See Goddard, The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction as the Rate Base (1927)
41 .A1&v. L. Rav. 564; West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore, 295
U. S. 662 (1935), rehearing denied, 296 U. S. 661 (1935).
7. See Comment (1930) 40 YAL L. J. 81.
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rates drastically during a depression, however, the argument is made that
public service companies, subject to constant governmental supervision, are
permitted during booms to earn an income but little above the level of con-
fisdation and therefore should not be compelled to reduce their rates in
a depression. The premise of the argument, however, that during the ex-
panding phases of a business cycle the earnings of industry in general are
far above those of utilities cannot be taken at its face value; on the contrary,
convincing evidence indicates that the incomes of utilities in periods of
expansion actually compares favorably with the earnings of all industry 8
Moreover, the development of numerous utility holding company systems
is indirect evidence that the utilities have not been without substantial reve-
nues.
Although many public utility statutes have long contained vague "emer-
gency" provisions for the fixing of "temporary" ratesO0 those provisions
have been little used except when they were invoked to sanction rate in-
creases to meet the extraordinary war conditions. In the few cases in which
these statutes were applied by commissions to order reductions in rates, the
courts have found them constitutionally defective. Three states, however,
have recently adopted more comprehensive temporary provisions especially
. NERovE, A DECADE or CoaroPaTEr Iicotrms .(1932) chs. 1II, VI, VII. Return
on Invested Capital, by Major Groups. (percentage).
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Mining and
Quarrying 8.1 -4.4 0.3 -0.6 -0.9 4.1 4.6 0.7 2.3 4.1
Manufacturing '9.5 -0.2 7.5 9.9 7.5 9.6 9.2 7.6 9.2 9.7
Construction 10.5 2.3 5.9 11.7' 11.3 13.2 12.8 12.4 11.2 10.9
Trade 7.3 -0.6 8.6 11.0 9.1 10.3 3.7 8.0 9.1 6.7
Total-All
Corporations 7. 1.1 " 6. 7.5 6.4 8.3 7.9 6.3 7.9 7.7
These figures from NEua.ovE, Ch. VII, should be contrasted with the average of ap-
proximately 71, A% allowed utilities under ordinary circumstances. An interesting light
is cast by the figures of net earnings of 1018 Corporations by groups. Source: MoODYs
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1935) p. aS:
1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928 1927 1926
923 Industrials
Millions of dollars 1198.8 778.2 D44. 766.8 766.8 3672.1 3124. 2546.6 2732.1
Index 44 28 -6.2 28 23 134 114 93 N0
70 Electric Utilities
Millions of dollars 274.6 294.5 343.5 413.6 413.6 414.4 365.7 314.5 274.6
Index 100 107 125 150 150 151 133 115 100
25 Gas Utilities
Millions of dollars 133.3 128.6 139.3 193.4 193.4 217.1 191.1 166.1 155.1
Index 86 83 90 125 125 140 123 107 100
See Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 767.
9. Swidler, The Uncertainties in the Legal Statis of Temporary Rates (1933)
12 P. U. FORT. 136 and 202. Detroit v. Detroit Edison Co., (Mich. P. U. Comm.)
P. U. R. 1933E, 193, 198.
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designed to meet depression conditions and to remedy deficiencies hitherto
pointed out by the courts.'0 In those states the commissions are authorized
to establish temporary rate schedules based on limited criteria of value and
to be effective only pending a complete evaluation of all the factors neces-
sary for the determination of the final rate in the traditional manner. If the
temporary rates are eventually found confiscatory, provision is made in the
final rates for recoupment to the utility of the loss suffered during the tem-
porary period.
The temporary rate schedule appears to be a sensible method of adjusting
utility rates to a price level which has moved sharply either upward or
downward. The establishment of temporary rates either under the older
general temporary statutes or under the more recently enacted and more
comprehensive provisions raises issues of statutory and constitutional sig-
nificance. (1) What are the conditions which justify the fixing of a tem-
porary rate schedule? (2) To what sort of hearing is the utility entitled?
(3) Upon what criteria of value may the temporary return be based? (4)
What is the content of the concept of "fair return" during a depression?
(5) And finally, what adjustments between the temporary and final rates
will the courts require to prevent them from classifying temporary rates
as deprivations of property without due process of law?
Before a radical departure from the traditional technique of rate-making
may be justified, most statutes require a finding of facts appropriate to the
theory of the temporary rate statute-a condition geneially characterized as
an "emergency". The legislatures usually delegate this determination to the
public utility commissions, giving them vague and varied standards to apply.
Some statutes simply rely upon the term "emergency" without further defi-
nition," the New Jersey statute, for example, giving the commission com-
plete discretion on this issue;12 in New York the "public interest" must
demand the summary rates,1 3 and in Illinois and Virginia it is necessary
to find that a utility has earned an income during the depression greatly
exceeding one ordinarily considered reasonable. 14 Findings of the pre-
requisite "emergency" by commissions is similarly varied, ranging from
10. ILL ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 111 2/3, §36; Nzv: Youc PunLIc
Szavic LAw § 114; VA. CoDE (Michie, Supp. 1934) §4071a. See Palmer, New York
Utility Legislation in 1934 (1934) 23 NAT. MuNic. REv. 594, 595.
11. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 12795; OHio ANN. CoDE (Page, 1926)
§ 614-32; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 196.70.
12. N. J. Laws 1935 c. 49. The New Jersey Board may "negotiate and agree"
with the utility for a temporary rate. Its inability to set a rate without the utility's
agreement renders the act useless. Irvington v. Commonwealth Water Co., (N. J. Bd.
P. U. Comm'rs, 1935) 10 P. U. R. (x. s.) 329.
13. N. Y. PUBLIC SERVICE LA.V § 114.
14. See note 10, mtpra. •
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"common knowledge"' 5 to thorough economic investigation.' c Whether the
emergency which purports to justify temporary rates falls within the statu-
tory definition, whether there has been undue delegation of power to the
commissions on that issue, and, even assuming a proper statutory finding of
emergency arrived at in a procedurely correct manner, whether that emer-
gency constitutionally justifies the fixing of temporary rates without a
thorough investigation of valuation are questions which present issues upon
which temporary rates may be judicially attacked. But the issue of emer-
gency, no matter how raised, should cause little difficulty to courts sym-
pathetic to the attempt to adjust rates when all other prices and values have
collapsed; for such a court would require no elaborate tables of index
figures or findings of fact to convince it that an emergency exists and that
the traditional extended valuation proceedings would be woefully inadequate
to achieve the purposes of temporary rate legislation. On the other hand,
if a court is unsympathetic to temporary rate schedules, it will be able to
find constitutional objections to the experiment more persuasive than the
propriety of the finding that an emergency exists.
Due process of law, in the procedural sense, would appear to require that
a utility be granted a hearing prior to any rate revision, even if the new
rates are provisional and temporary and if a final rate, in the determination
of which the utility will be heard, is to correct whatever deficiencies are
discovered in the temporary schedule. In view of decisions enjoining rate
orders entered without a hearing, most recent temporary rate statutes pro-
vide for a hearing,17 and commissions have uniformly construed incomplete
statutes as so providing.13 An extended hearing upon all the elements of
a complete valuation, however, would frustrate the primary purpose of the
temporary orders to adjust utility rate schedules speedily. The requirements
of due process should be held satisfied if the utility is gven an opportunity
to present evidence on the limited issues set forth in the temporary rate
15. LaCrosse v. R. R. Comm., 172 Wis. 233, 178 N. WV. 867, P. U. R. 1921A,
22 (1920); In re Southern California Gas Co., (Calif. R. R. Comm.) P. U. P 1933E,
61. Some commissions have compared edsting conditions with a definition of "emer-
gency" in terms of utilities. it re Lincoln Traction Co., (Neb. St. Ry. Comm.)
P.U.R. 1918D, 168; It re Nashville Ry. and Light Co., (Tenn IL R. and P. U.
Comm.) P.U.R. 1920C, 3; In re Okla. Nat. Gas Corp., (Okla. P.U.C) P.U. .
1931B, 470, 476.
16. In re Wisconsin Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1932D, 173, 244 ct seq.; See Lilienthal,
supra note 1, at 746.
17. See Smith, Emergency Rates and Due Process (1934) 14 P. U. Fonr. 624.
Indiana General Service Co. v. McCardle, 1 F. Supp. 113, P.U.R 1932D, 378 (S.D.
lId. 1932)$ Tri-State Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Benson, P. U. L 1933A, 38 (D. Minn. 1932).
18. Smith, supra note 17, at 625 and cases there cited; Ill. Commerce Comm.
v. Public Service Comm. of Ill., 4 P.U. R. (.s.) 1, 76; In re Misconsin Telephone
Co. P.U.k. 1932D, 173.
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statutes,'0 particularly since there will be an extended hearing before the
utility's rights aie definitely settled in the final rates.
The fact that reproduction cost new is an important element of fair value
renders the traditional valuation procedure far too cumbersome when rapid
adjustment of rates is sought. One of the remedies for this situation is a
restriction in the criteria of value which must be investigated by commis-
sions before temporary rates may be fixed. Although some general tem-
porary statutes simply auhthorize commissions to fix temporary rates in
emergencies without elaboration of procedures or conditions precedent,2
recent statutes fill in the details more completely. The Virginia and Illinois
statutes provide for an investigation similar to that traditionally employed
for rate-making, but in abbreviated form.2' The commissions in those two
states are directed to examine the reports, books, and property of utilities
to determine the extent to which rates must be reduced to bring them down
to levels considered reasonable.2 The New York statute is unique and quite
definitely more effective.23 The criterion of value there prescribed is original
cost less accrued depreciation, and the utilities are required to keep their
records and accounts in such manner that those figures are readily avail-
able at all times. This treatment of value for temporary rate-making pur-
poses in New York can be simply administered and permits more speedy
and efficient adjustment of rates during a depression than any of the pro-
cedures outlined in other temporary rate statutes.
Fair return, the first half of the traditional formula by which courts assess
the constitutional reasonableness of rates, theoretically offers a measure of
flexibility which may be profitably exploited during a depression. Mr.
Justice Butler has defined a fair return as "that [return) generally being
made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on invest-
ments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties." 24 The sharp reduction in the earnings of all busi-
ness enterprises during the depression suggests that a reconsideration of the
19. Such evidence should satisfy the requirement of a reviewing court for a record
showing the basis of the commission action. Smith, supra note 17, at 626.
20. See note 11, .supra.
21. See note 10, supra.
22. The temporary rate is to absorb only the amount by which the existing net
income exceeds a reasonable return. Statutes cited note 10, supra. Only one order
has been made under these closely similar statutes, Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public
Service Co. of Northern Ill., (1934) 4 P. U.R. (. s.) 1, but the Virginia Commission
has with the aid of the statute negotiated for revisions in gas, water, and electric
rates. saving $3,000,000 annually. Communication to the Yale Law journal, Oct. 5,
1936, from H. E. Ketner, Commerce Counsel, State Corporation Commission.
23. See note 10, supra.
24. Bluefield Waterworks Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,
262 U.S. 679, 692-3 (1923).
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fair return concept might go a long way toward permitting utility rates
to be reduced in depressions. The temporary rate statutes, however, make
no attempt to manipulate "fair return" to achieve this end. Even the New
York statute provides that temporary rates shall return at least 57 to the
utility on the value of its property as determined by the book value criteria
of the statute.2 Moreover, in spite of the flexibility theoretically inherent
in the judicial definition of fair return, when the courts consider the issue,
they appear to hit upon an arbitrary percentage without reference to the
comparative level of earnings in business undertakings attended by the same
risks. In view of .this experience it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
permit utility earnings to fall during a depression as far as the implications
of its definition of fair return would suggest.- 2
An alternative criterion-stressing "value of the service" rather than its
cost as the decisive factor in fixing emergency rates-is beginning to emerge.
While it might be urged that "value of the service" and "fair return upon
fair value" are competing ambiguities expressing the same thought, the
former manner of statement definitely looks to the interests of consumers,
and seems to permit rate reductions during depressions more easily than
fair-return-on-a-fair-value techniques. This standard in rate-making is nec-
essarily approximate, and perhaps meaningless in a field, like utility rates,
where prices are only remotely influenced by factors of competition; the
problem is analogous to the rate-making issue in connection with railroad
rates, and the regulation of carriers in general, where "what the traffic will
bear" is said to be still the basic standard used by the carrier in formulating
its rates and a standard of considerably more practical importance even for
the courts than the rule that rates must be "reasonably compensatory " -
Although "value of the service" can hardly be considered an objective cri-
terion upon which utility rates may be based with any degree of definiteness,
findings based on such a standard are not more completely judgments of
opinion than conclusions required by an application of "fair return upon a
fair value" concepts. And the Supreme Court has expressed verbal approval
of the formula; for in Smyth v. Ames28 the statement was made that "the
public is entitled to demand . . . that no more be exacted from it than
25. See note 10, supra.
26. During ordinary times a return of 6%7 has been found non-confiscatory. Dayton
Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v.
Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912). An equal or but slightly lower return has been
found lawful during the depression. It re Customers of New Bedford Gas and Edison
Light Co., (Conn. Public Service Comm. 1933) P.U.R. 1933D, 256 (6%,1S); Illinois
Bell TeL Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595, P. U.R. 1933E, 301 (N. D. II1. 1933) (5',i%);
Kankakee Water Co. v. Gilbert, P. U. R. 1933B, 145 (E. D. Ill. 1933) (5.17%).
27. See DANimS, TnE PIcE OF TRASPOarsrRTxoN SmvicE (1932) 85..
28. 169 U. S. 466, 547 (1S97).
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the services rendered are reasonably worth", and this view has been repeated
upon several occasions.20
Believing that those words mean something, some commissions have
established and some courts have approved emergency rate schedules scaling
down utility charges on the theory that the value of utility services declined
during a depression. The Wisconsin Commission in the notable Wisconsin
Telephone Company case took this position when it reduced rates for local
exchange service by 12%%.30 The Commission found that the existing rates
were unreasonably high and ordered reduced rates to be applied for a
temporary period. The method used to arrive at the figure of 122%,
however, indicates the difficulty of breaking entirely away from the concept
of a "fair return upon a fair value" in the utility field; for the Commission
found that the reduced rates would yield a sum sufficient to pay all oper-
ating expenses and provide for depreciation, taxes and interest, and dividends
on -preferred stock with 6% on the common stock attributable to the local
exchange property, leaving in addition a "cushion" of $288,000.31 The
Commission further considered the earnings at that period of other business
enterprises with comparable risks in the same area and the need of the
utility for new capital and a sound credit position in light of then existing
conditions.32 Although upon the appeal of the case the Supreme Court has
refused to commit itself on the validity of this procedure,3 3 the Wisconsin
Commission has continued its policy of giving "value of service" the para-
mount place in emergency rate determination.34 The Alabama Commission
29. San Diego L. & T. Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 757 (1899); Illinois
Cent. R. R. v. I: C. C., 206 U. S. 441, 463 (1907); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.
352, 454 (1913); Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U. S. 564, 570 (1917).
30. In re Wisconsin Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1932D, 173.
31. Id. at 240-1; Cf. Prendergast, supra, note 1, at 243, objecting on the ground
that no allowance is made for expansion or contingency reserve.
32. Id. at 272-3.
33. Hearings on the Wisconsin Telephone case began July 29, 1931. A temporary
order was issued June 30, 1932. A temporary restraining order was obtained from
a single Federal judge and application made to a statutory three judge court for an
interlocutory injunction which was granted with a finding that the temporary rate
was confiscatory, but with no findings of .fact. The injunction was vacated by the
Supreme Court, the restraining order being kept, and the case remanded to the
statutory court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. P. S. Comm. of Wisconsin
v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 289 U. S. 67 (1933), P. U. R. 1933C, 264. That procedure has
not been carried out. A second temporary order was issued and restrained with appli-
cation for an interlocutory injunction. And a third order was issued, July 5, 1934.
In re Wisconsin Telephone Co., 6 P. U. R. (x. s.) 389.
34. Gehrke v. Interstate Light and Power Co., (Wis. P., S. Comm.) P.U.R.
1933C, 154; In re Wisconsin Power and Light Co., P. U. R. 1933D, 156 ("interim
rates" not termed "reasonable!' but merely tentative or interlocutory); Penterman v.
Kaukauna, (Wis. P. S. Comm.) P. U. R. 1933B, 397; Russell v. Commonwealth Co.,
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has adopted a similar attitude concerning the constitutional limit of rate
regulation,35 and the Maine Commission has taken even a firmer stand as
a matter of permanent policy, supported by the Supreme Court of that
state, which said: "If the rates established represent the ma-dmum reason-
able value of the service to the consumer, it cannot be said that they are
confiscatory as to the Company, whatever may be the result upon its re-
turns.3 3
Prior to the current depression, the only other period during which the
validity of temporary rate changes was passed upon by the courts was during
and immediately following the World War. All costs rose to high levels
during that era and rate increases were liberally granted by commissions
where the utilities could show that their services or financial structures -were
endangered by the rise in the price levelV7 The emergency rates of that
period were based entirely upon the increased cost to the utility of rendering
the service, without any valuation of the property devoted to the public
service, and where the issue was presented to the courts, the increases were
upheld. 8 The wartime experience, however, does not furnish a direct
analogy to support teinporary rate decreases during a depression against
constitutional attack. When a consumer argues that utility rates are so
far above the confiscatory level that they are unreasonable, he raises no
constitutional issue. He must rely upon the common law or statutory duty
of the utility to charge reasonable rates; and the criteria applicable to his
case may be quite different from those invoked when a utility attacks a
rate on the ground that property is taken without due process of law.
Where temporary rates scaling down utility charges have come before
the courts in the past, they have been regarded with suspicion.30 Although
(Wis. P. S. Comm.) P.J.R. 1933B, 441 (telephone rates lowered to value of service
to induce former patrons to return).
35. City of Troy v. Alabama Utility Co., (Ala. P. S. Comm. 1931) P.U.R.
1932A, 435.
36. Hamilton v. Caribou-Water, Light and Power Co., 121 Me. 422, 425-6, 117
At. 582, 584 (1922), quoted in Gay v. Damariscotta-Newcastle Water Co., 131 Me.
304, 162 AtI. 264 (1932) ; Brunswick and T. Water Dist. v. Maine Water Co., 99 Me.
371, 59 At. 537 (1904). For a unique application of the value of the service concept
see 1933 12 P. U. Fomn. 294.
37. The numerous commission orders are collected in the Public Utility Reports
for 1918 to 1921. Such increases were refused where the utility could not show probable
injury. In re Tr-State Tel. and Tel. Co., (Minn. R. R. & Warehouse Comm.) P.U.R.
1919C, 5.
38. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hilton, 274 Fed. 384 (D. Mim. 1921); Chicago
Rys. Co. v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 190, 126 N. E. 585, P.U.R. 1921A, 77 (1920); Yansas
City v. Public Service Comm. of Mo., 276 Mo. 539, 210 S.'W. 381, P.U.R. 1919D,
422; O'Brien v. Public Utility Comm'rs, 92 N. J. Law 587, 105 At. 132, P.U.R.
1919D, 774; Okla. Gas and Electric Co. v. State Corp. Comm., 83 Okla. 281, 201 Pa(.
505 (1921).
39. This attitude has prevailed despite the presumption in favor of administrative
determination which requires one seeking to enjoin rates to show dearly their con-
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some state courts have upheld rates considered compensatory no matter
how computed,4 0 those thought to be confiscatory, even though established
for a brief interval, have been restrained.41 The rationale of those restrain-
ing orders is clearly set forth in Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.:42
"They [temporary rates] were final legislative acts as to the period during
which they should remain in effect pending the final determination; and if
the rates prescribed were confiscatory, the company would be deprived of
a reasonable return upon its property during the period, without remedy,
unless their enforcement should be enjoined." In that case the Supreme
Court, enjoining the temporary reduction, continued the old rates until
the completion of the new final schedule, and required the utility to give
a bond for repayment of whatever overcharges during the temporary period
a subsequent final determination of rates would reveal. Although the Court
apparently considered bonding adequate to protect consumers of utility
services, that procedure not only prevents the adjustment of rates so ur-
gently needed in a depression, but does not even assure repayment to sur-
charged consumers.4 3
fiscatory character. San Diego L. & T. Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 441, 446 (1903);
Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153 (1915); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Hyde, 275 U. S. 440 (1928).
40. Elliott v. Empire Nat. Gas Co., 123 Kan. 558, 256 Pac. 114, P. U. R. 1932D,
751; Upstate Tel. Corp. v. Maltbie, 154 Misc. 512, 278 N. Y. Supp. 283 (Sup. Ct.
1934) ; Am. Indian Oil Co. v. Collins & Co., 157 Okla. 49, 9 P. (2d) 438 (1932) P. U. R.
1932C, 267.
41. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Mo., 262 U.S. 276
(1923) ; Prendergast v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1922) ; Indiana Gen. Serv.
Co. v- McCardle, 1 F. Supp. 113, (S. D. Ind. 1932); New York Edison Co. v. Mfaltbie,
244 App. Div. 436, 279 N. Y. Supp. 949, 8 P. U. R. (x. s.) 337 (3d Dep't 1935);
Cleveland v. Public Utility Comm., 126 Ohio St. 91, 183 N.E. 924 (1933).
42. 262 U. S. 43 (1922), italics supplied. A temporary reduction was made under
N. Y. PUBLIC SERvcs LAWv § 97 pending final determination. It was said that: "If
the Commission, however, had fixed an early date for the final hearing, this might
have been taken into consideration by the court as an element affecting the exercise
of its discretion in the matter of granting an interlocutory injunction.' 262 U. S. at
50. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1921) ("A limit in time, to tide over
a passing trouble, may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.") ;
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 204 U. S. 543 (1924); Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCardle,
P.U.R. 1933B, 222 (S. D. Ind. 1932). Time limits are set in Illinois and Virginia
at nine months unless extended three more by the commission, but not in Wisconsin,
Indiana, Ohio, or New York which require only that the final rate become effectual
when found.
43. Return of excess rates by the utility to surcharged consumers is unsatisfactory
in the case of'gas, electric, and water services when the cost and inconvenience of the
accounting is practically prohibitive, and impossible in the case of street railways. See
International Ry. Co. v. Prendergast, 52 Fed. (2d) 293, (W. D. N.Y. 1930) (increased
rate with bond denied to street railway) ; Beutel, Due Process in Valualion of Utilities
(1929) 13 MiNe. L. REv. 409, 433; (1934) 34 Cor- L. REv. 379.
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Since the bonding device, however inadequate it may be, has been judi-
dally approved,"4 the legislatures of Illinois, Virginia, and New York have
adopted its converse, the "recoupment clause". Under the procedure set
up in those statutes temporary rates are determined speedily on an abbre-
viated investigation of the books and/or property of the utility, and pro-
vision is made in the final rates for reimbursement to the utility to the
extent that final rates as fixed after a full valuation show that the temporary
schedule was too low.u It is the purpose of the recoupment provision to
avoid the Supreme Court's condemnation of finality and lack of redress in
the Prendergast case, and to forestall allegations of irreparable injury.4
Pursuant to the newly-enacted New York statute, the New York Public
Service Commission entered a temporary order reducing the rates of the
Bronx Gas and Electric Company approximately 20% and of the Yonkers
Light and Power Company 6%, to a point at which it was computed that
the utilities would receive an excess of 6% upon book value.-" Upon attack
by the utilities of the order and the statute upon which it was based, the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the procedure as constitutional. 43 The
Court stated that a temporary rate schedule provided a reasonable means
for flexible adjustment of rates to a changed price level and that the pro-
vision for recoupment out of the final rates remedied the defect of pre-
mature finality which was declared fatal in the Prendergast case. Since in
the past courts have required the utilities to put up bonds to pay back
customers overcharges which had been exacted pending a final rate deter-
mination, the New York Court considered it feasible and legal to turn
the remedy about and provide that the consuming public should make good
44. Bonding has been used in conjunction with a continuance of the existing high
rate pending final reduction, as in the Prendergast case, and with a temporary rate
increase pending final determination of the higher rate. See Banton v. Belt Line Ry.
Co., 268 U.S. 413 (1924). See also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S.
196, 204 (1924); Indiana Gen. Serv. Co. v. McCardle 1 F. Supp. 113, P. U. P. 1932D,
378 (S. D. Ind. 1932); (1933) 1 GEo. VAsHr. L. Ray. 286, (1934) 34 Co.. I. Rmu. 379.
45. See note 10, supra. The Oklahoma Commission pursued a similar policy in
setting a temporary low rate with the promise to reimburse the utility if the rate
was found too low. In re Oklahoma Nat. Gas Corp., P.U.R. 1931B, 470, 476;
In re Anthony, P.U.R. 1930B, 481.
46. Swidler, supra note 9, at 204.
47. Bronx Gas and Electric Co. v. Maltbie, Yonkers Electric Light and Pover
Co. v. Afaltbie, 271 N. Y. 304, 368-9, 3 I. E. (2d) 512, 513 (1936). If all the
elements of value which the companies insisted upon were included, the return vwould
be 4.89% for The Yonkers Co. and 4.84% for The Bronx Co., 272 N. Y. at 376,
3 N. E. (2d) at 516.
48. Ibid. (1936) 36 Cor- L. Rxv. 1177. It should be noted that there has been
no judicial disapproval of temporary rates based on statutes providing recoupment
Condemnation has been of final rates which leave the utility without redress and does
not apply to statutory schedules which are provisional and reparative.
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to the company the loss which it may have sustained in temporarily ex-
.acting too little.40
It is clear that the Supreme Court will not approve temporary rates
thought to be prima facie confiscatory if they are defended solely on the
ground that *they are probationalU0 The guarantee of recoupment in the
final rates based upon a full valiation, however, should render constitu-
tutional those rates which have been reduced for a temporary period in the
public interest, even if some of those rates are ultimately found to have
been confiscatory for the brief period in which they were effective. Per-
mitting the provision for recoupment to save the constitutionality of tem-
porary rates miay be justified in either of two ways. In the first place, there
appears to be no compelling economic or legal reason for holding that the
compensation to which a utility is constitutionally entitled must be constant
or must be adequate during each fiscal period. The relation of the utility
to the public is a long continuing one; and both due process of law and
economic policy appear to demand only that the return be a fair one on a
fair value as an average, and would seem to permit deviations above or
below that level where assurance is made that the balance will be restored,
not necessarily within a year or other definite accounting period, but within
a longer or shorter period as the circumstances warrantr' A second ap-
proach, urged in support of the New York statute, -2 is that the Constitution
permits a present confiscation with assured future compensation 3 If com-
pensation were guaranteed out of the public treasury, this view would un-
doubtedly be upheldY4 And where payment is provided for in future rates,
the same result should obtain; for the demand for utility services is rela-
tively inelastic and guarantees reimbursement quite as effectively as would
payment out of the public treasury.
49. 271 N. Y. at 373-4, 3 N. E. (2d) at 515.
50. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (1909); Northern Pacific
R. . Co. v. Dept. Pub. Works, 268 U.S. 37 (1925); Smith, supra note 17, at 628.
SI. " . . . the fair rate of return to which public utilities are entitled is one
that is adequate on the average . . . they have no legitimate ground for complaint
if on the average they are permitted to earn an adequate rate of return." JONES AND
BIGEAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 262. Cf. Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
225 N. Y. 89, 121 N. E. 772 (1918).
52. Argument of Counsel in Bronx Gas and Electric Co. v. Maltbie. Although
the argument was not commented upon in the Court of Appeals decision on the case,
it was approved by the dissenting opinion in the lower court, 283 N. Y. Supp. 839,
853 (1935).
53. The analogy between taking by eminent domain and confiscatory rates is
made in West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., "295 U. S. 662, 671 (1935). See also People V.
Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 685 (1899), aff'd, 176 U. S. 335 (1900) ;
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 400, 404, 407 (1895); Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251
U. S. 233, 238 (1919).
54. Cases cited note 53, supra. But see Sage v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189
(1882) (a guarantee from taxes of a limited assessment district held inadequate).
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A minor objection urged by the utility against the recoupment clause is
that the reparative final rate might be charged to consumers who have just
moved into the territory and therefore did not have the benefit of the low
temporary rate. The Court, while not convinced that the utility was in a
position to make that argument on behalf of the new customers, answvered
the contention. The Constitution, it decdred, sets forth only fundamental
principles, and considerations of administrative convenience support a
measure conforming to those broad constitutional outlines, even though
deviating from them in minor details. 5
But the depression is apparently .passing and with it the urgent need for
emergency rate schedules. The statutes of Illinois, Virginia, and particularly
New York, however, furnish models to be followed by other states in pro-
viding a constitutional, machinery for ordering temporary rates whenever
they are again needed.56 But the depression experiments in temporary rate
regulation have failed vigorously to exploit the possibility of basing itility
rates more directly on "value of service" criteria. Despite difficulties of
measuring the "value" of utility services in the absence of market compe-
tition for them, such standards have long been used in the regulation of
carrier rates and have considerable judicial support when applied to utility
charges. -7  The recent statutory attempts to reduce utility rates quickly
during the depression have been confined to making the valuation process
more flexible, within the formula of a "fair return on a fair value". Within
the limit§ of this objective, these statutes promise to make substantial relief
available during the next depression, if the Supreme Court approves their
plan. Although most of the depression period was spent in devising these
statutes and testing them in the courts, they now offer an improved tech-
nique for forcing rates to move with other prices.
The experience of the depression illustrates again the thesis that the
fundamental barrier to effective rate regulation is the emphasis upon repro-
duction cost new less depreciation in the determination of value. Even in
normal times the valuation of utility property for rate-making purposes is
an extraordinarily cuanbersome procedure, a deficiency which is dramatically
illustrated when rates must be reduced quickly. If the basic "fair return
on a fair value" formula is to be retained as the central theme of utility
regulation, the need for and the usefulness of book value or prudent invest-
55. Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Mfalthie, 271 N. Y. 364, 374-5, 3 N. E. (2d) 515,
516 (1936).
56. Lilienthal, spra note 1, at 754-755, -'Zes that a "depression reserve!' be
accumulated from rates in excess of a legal fair return during good times and set
aside to assure the utility a fair return although a rate reduction would be made
during depression. A like view is e.xpressed in JoNEs AIM BIGHIUM, op. Cit. srlpra
note 1, at 261.
57. See note 29, mipra.
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ment as a valuation base, so strongly urged by Mr. Justice Brandeis and
Mr. Justice Holmes in dissenting from the decision of Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,58 are more ap-
parent now than at the time of their argument.59 The practicality of that
base for obtaining quick and orderly rate adjustment has been demonstrated
by its use under the New York temporary rate statute. And the major ob-
jection to it at the time of Smyth v. AmesO0 -theabsence of careful records
-is today less valid than when Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. dissent pointed to the then existing careful accounting
systems which commissions of most states were authorized to impose upon
utilities. Uniform accounting systems, such as those recently adopted by the
Federal Communications Commission and Federal Power Commission for
their licensees and interstate companies and by the New York Public Service
Commission for companies in its jurisdiction, should go far further to weaken
that objection. 1 Whether historical cost will ever be allowed completely
to replace reproduction cost new is yet to be determined. Certainly the
usage of regulating bodies places less and less emphasis on reproduction
cost, and the current uniform accounting movement, now strengthened by
the support of the Supreme Court,0 2 may finally eliminate reproduction cost
as a useful standard for rate-making.
58. 262 U: S. 276 (1923), at 289 ef seq.
59. In this classic 'dissent Mr. Justice Brandeis concisely states the logic of the
prudent investment base. Affirming its validity today, whatever its early utility, the
Justice points out: "Those were the days (the time of Smyth v. Ames) before state
legislation prohibited the issue of public utility securities without authorization from
state officials; before accounting was prescribed and supervised; when outstanding
bonds and stocks were hardly an indication of the amount of capital embarked in the
enterprise; when depreciation accounts were unknown; and when value, or property
accounts, furnished no trustworthy evidence either of cost or of real value." But an
extended discussion of faults of the reproduction cost base and merits of the prudent
investment base is beyond the scope of this comment. See MIIosnE AlD CRAWFOrD,
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933) ch. XV; ROBisoN, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES
(2d ed. 1935) p. 397-9; BAUER AND GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION (1935) pp. XII,
477. The objection made by Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 754-755, that the frozen or
rigid rate base obtained from use of prudent investment would prevent rate adjustment
in high or low economic periods is valid only so long as the 'flexibility inherent in rate
of return continues to be disregarded, and fails if proper attention is given to this
neglected factor.
60. 169 U. S. 466 (1897).
61. See N. Y. Times, May 20, 193.6, p. 33, col. 1; id. May 25, 1936, p. 6, col. 3;
id. Oct. 25, 1936, § III, p. 1, col. 5; ii?. Oct. 31, 1936, p. 27, col. 4.
62. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, (Dec. 7, 1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEIc 351.
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